Daniel Lund III | Phelps Dunbar
That’s not how I read it.
A general contractor seeking to litigate with its subcontractor concerning a construction project in Indiana found itself fighting in court against assertions by the sub that arbitration of the dispute was required.
The GC was already in litigation in federal court with the project owner. The GC filed a third-party demand against the sub, which was met with a motion to stay and to compel arbitration.
At the crux of the sub’s argument was this clause in its subcontract: “Subcontractor agrees that the dispute resolution provisions of the Prime Contract between [GC] and Owner, if any, are incorporated by reference as part of this Subcontract so as to be binding as to disputes between Subcontractor and [GC] that involve, in whole or in part, questions of fact and/or law that are common to any dispute between [GC] and Owner or others similarly bound to such dispute resolution procedures… .”
In fact, the prime contract between the GC and owner contained an arbitration clause, although it is apparent that the GC and owner opted to ignore that clause for their own dispute. The principal question for the court to decide: is there a dispute “within the scope” of the written arbitration agreement in the subcontract?
The federal court noted that “as the Court interprets both federal and state law, if the agreement to arbitrate unambiguously does not cover the dispute at hand, then the federal and Indiana policies in favor of arbitration never come into play.”
Reading deeper into the dispute resolution procedures of the subcontract, the court found that the incorporation into the subcontract of the arbitration provision from the prime contract was qualified by additional subcontract language which specified “consolidation” of GC/sub disputes in arbitration with the owner. The subcontract further provided that if the foregoing “conditions” did not apply, then the GC – “at its sole option” – had the right to institute litigation or arbitration against the sub. All of this led to the GC’s argument that the sub lacked the “independent right to demand arbitration,” a position with which the federal court agreed:
“The only logical interpretation of that language is that [the initial arbitration language] was intended to be a joinder provision, not a stand-alone arbitration clause, for what other purpose would there be for a requirement of ‘common questions of fact and/or law’ than to ensure that such questions are resolved in the same proceeding? … [The joinder] language is superfluous if the parties actually intended to bind [the GC] to arbitration of disputes with [the sub] even when the common questions of law or fact at issue are being litigated in court by [GC and owner].”
The court’s opinion denying the motion goes on thereafter for pages, further ratcheting down the court’s rationale. This points up the lengths to which many courts will go – without parol evidence – to make sense of contractual provisions to reach a result that (more than likely) the parties never intended when negotiating their agreement. The takeaway: draft clear, easy-to-read contracts!
Eastgate Invs. II LLC v. MW Builders, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53753 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2023)
When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.